






















This paper analyzes the effects of different sources of R&D funding and patent office attributes 
on the patenting process. Another important contribution is modeling the effect of a random 
delay in the ‘pendency’ time as a stochastic process and quantifying its effect on patenting. The 
empirical estimation is based on four major industries – electronics, chemical and biology, 
transportation and aeronautics – for the time period 1976-1998. The primary results are: First, the 
source of R&D funding as well as performer (academic, federal and industry) has a differential 
effect on patenting. Second, the effects of some types of R&D and spillovers are different post-
1990. Third, in the short run patenting is heavily influenced by patent office attributes. The state 
level analysis sheds light on the differing role of the federal government as an R&D performed 
and as a source of R&D funds for industry. The results contribute to a better understanding of the 
shortcomings in the formulation of science indicators.  
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  1INTRODUCTION 
Patents have often been used as a proxy for innovations. As a metric for inventive 
activity, although far from perfect (Griliches, 1990, Cockburn & Griliches, 1988), they are often 
the best indicator available to a researcher. The complex nature of the patent data, make clear-cut 
conclusions about the relationship between patents and innovations, difficult. To get a sense of 
what the number of patents mean, one needs to understand what determines them. It is helpful to 
disaggregate the patenting process and look at two distinct phases. First, the incentive of the 
inventers to patent a given innovation needs to be analyzed. Second, the resource-constrained 
behavior of the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has to be factored in to gain a better 
understanding of patent grants. This paper focuses on the determinants of patenting in the United 
States. 
One of the important questions in this area of research is how the patent grant numbers 
relate to the nature and amount of research and development (R&D) expenditures and other 
industry fundamentals. Problems in interpreting the patent data stem from a number of factors. 
First, patent application and patent grants do not always follow the same trend. Grants are 
heavily influenced by the inefficiencies and constraints of the USPTO (Griliches, 1989). Second, 
fluctuations in R&D affect patents, but less than proportionately (Griliches, 1989). Third, current 
patent applications are strongly correlated with current R&D (Pakes, 1985). All these factors 
make it really difficult to interpret the actual linkage between patents and R&D. This paper 
attempts to model the determinants of patenting and quantify the effects of those determinants. 
Keeping the above facts in mind, any model of patent production needs to recognize 
several salient factors. It is important to realize that there is no one to one relationship between 
patenting, innovations and R&D. Both past and present company R&D has a strong positive 
  2influence on patenting activity. The source through which R&D activities are funded have 
different impacts on the productivity of innovations and hence the number of patents. Generally, 
econometric studies have failed to find significant direct productivity effects of federal R&D, 
whereas company R&D, both past and current, is highly significant. This has led some 
researchers to hypothesize that the effect of federal R&D on productivity works through indirect 
channels (Mansfield and Switzer, 1984; Lichtenberg,1984, 1987, 1988). University R&D has 
strong positive spillovers regarding corporate patenting. There is evidence of geographic 
spillovers when industry and university are co-located (Cohen et al., 1997; Feller et al., 1998; 
Griliches, 1989; Jaffe, 1989; Klevorick 1994; Mansfield (1991); Mowery, 1997; Nelson, 1986).   
Patenting is also influenced by a host of market structure variables
1. Researchers have 
found a positive link between firm size, R&D and innovation (Cohen & Levin, 1989; 
Schmookler, 1972), whereas the relationship between market concentration and innovation have 
been found to be ambiguous ((Mansfield, 1963, 1968
2; Scherer, 1965; Williamson, 1965). Last, 
resources at the patent office, patent fees and law changes that alter the length or breadth of 
patent protection have profound effects on the number of patents granted in the short-run. 
Inventors may look at the average time it takes to grant a patent and then decide whether to apply 
for a patent or protect their innovation as a trade secret. In areas, where the half-life of an 
invention is short, delay in patent processing may imply reduced applications and hence 
decreased grants. 
With these facts in mind, I provide a short theoretical sketch that helps in motivating the 
subsequent empirical model. This background model incorporates industry characteristics, 
                                                           
1 For a detailed analysis please refer to Kamien & Schwartz: “Market Structure and Innovation: A Survey”, in the 
Journal of Economic Literature, 1975, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 1 – 37. 
  3different types of R&D and US Patent Office variables and seeks to explain the determinants of 
patenting under different production function assumptions and cost conditions. Some important 
contributions of this paper are to look at the direct and spillover effects of federal R&D and 
university on patenting, the importance of past versus present company R&D, the effect of 
academic R&D, the influence of market structures, US Patent Office resources as determinants 
of the number of patents granted and the effect of delays in pendency time. Four major R&D 
industries, electronics, chemicals/biology
3, transportation and aeronautics are studied.   
 
SECTION 2: MOTIVATING THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
This section provides a brief theoretical justification for the subsequent empirical model. 
The purpose of this exercise is to analyze the formulation of the patent production and cost 
functions at the industry level. Inter-firm rivalry and patent races between firms within the 
industry is ignored and the number of firms in the industry is normalized to one, i.e. consider the 
whole industry as one giant firm for decision making purposes. The process of obtaining a patent 
is broken down into two parts. The first stage deals with actual inventions and innovations. At 
the end of this stage we observe a number of inventions, each with a different value. The second 
stage deals with patenting that invention. This involves the application for a patent, the waiting 
period at the patent office (USPTO) and finally the approval or rejection of the patent 
application.  This model tries to combine the flavors of several earlier works in the literature 
(Griliches, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990 & Jaffe, 1986, 1989) and presents a unified approach. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2 (1963) The author found that during 1919-58 in petroleum refining and bituminous coal the largest four firms did 
most of the innovating, but this was not true for the steel industry. Thus it is not always the case that the largest 
firms are the greatest innovators. 
3 Ideally one would have liked to separate chemicals and biology. But data constraints imply that only 3 years of 
data are available for biology. Also, since we cannot separate chemicals from biology R&D for the other years, the 
chemicals numbers include both. Thus separating them will produce incorrect R&D numbers. 
  4In the first stage, the industry invests in R&D with the aim of producing inventions and 
innovations. The innovations may be cost reducing or quality enhancing, or the industry may 
discover a new product or process altogether. The objective function of the industry is to 
maximize the value of the innovations it produces. We assume that each industry engages in ‘N’ 
projects, each of which will yield an invention. Thus, inventions can be modeled as a function of 
the following variables: 
(1)                                                       ) , , , ( kt kt SP URD kt FRD kt CRD f kt N =
where: N =1,…n, and denotes the number of inventions, ‘k’ denotes the industry and t denotes 
the time period. CRDkt is the stock of company performed R&D in the particular industrial 
category. FRDkt is the stock of federally funded industrial R&D. URDkt is the university 
performed R&D (contains R&D dollars from all funding sources) in that industrial category. SPkt 
is the spillover that the industry receives from federal R&D or academic R&D.  
Each project N=1,…n, results in an invention. Each invention has a commercial value 
(VN) between 0 and ∞, i.e. VN  ∼ [0, ∞). In principle, VN reflects the fact that there is 
heterogeneity in the value of inventions. The uncertainty in the invention process is reflected by 
the fact that exante, the industry does not know the exact value of the invention that results from 
the R&D investment. It only knows the distribution of values – an exponential in this case.  
The size of the industry and an R&D composition variable are incorporated as shift 
parameters in this value function. Usually, the bigger the firm/industry, the more inventions it is 
going to make. The R&D composition variable, measures what portion of the R&D is financed 
by the industry’s own resources. In a sense, we expect, that the more of its own resources a firm 
uses, the greater will be number of inventions, due to shareholder pressure. I assume that the 
  5average value of inventions is greater in an industry that finances a majority of R&D from its 
own resources. Thus SIZE denotes the scale of operation and COMP reflects the composition of 
R&D, i.e., what portion of total industry performed R&D is funded by the industry itself. Thus 
the density function of VN is given by: 
where: ‘b’ is the mean and variance of the exponential distribution. 
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  The industry applies for a patent if E(VN) > E(Ckt), i.e. the expected cost of patenting 
(Ckt) is less than the expected value of the invention (VN). We assume that if the industry applies 
for the patent, it gets the patent with probability one
4. Therefore the industry obtains the patent if: 
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Therefore, from equation (1) and (3), the expected number of patents in year t is: 
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Section 2.1: Patent Production and Cost Functions 
There are two alternative invention production functions that can be studied. One is the 
more traditional Cobb-Douglas production function that has been studied thoroughly in the 
literature. The other formulation tries to model the spillovers more directly. I shall outline both 
models below. 
(5)         .
]       [ ,
kt
FRD
kt kt URD CRD N
s t k k k − + =
γ β α
                                                           
4 To simply one layer of the problem, we assume that all patents that are applied for are granted. Alternatively, we 
could have assumed that there is a fixed grant rate for each industry in each year and thus the number of applications 
multiplied by this grant rate would give us the number of patents granted. This would not make any difference for 
our empirical model, and is thus not incorporated here.  
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where: N is the number of inventions in industry k in year t and A is the technological constant. 
In theory, the patent cost function should include both monetary and non-monetary costs. 
The major monetary costs would be the lawyers’ fees
5 and the USPTO fees. The main non-
monetary cost would be time it takes for the patent to be granted, any law changes that affect the 
cost of patenting. Since the main purpose of the exercise is to motivate the empirical model, data 
constraints dictate that we consider only those variables that we can quantify. So attention is 
limited to the quantifiable variables – law change and pendency time. 
Let the cost of getting a patent be denoted by: 
(7)                                                                            t t kt D L C θ φ + =
 
where: Lt is the law change variable. Dt reflects the time that the industry expects the USPTO to 
take to process an application. It is the time between application of a patent and its issue or 
abandonment. This delay at the USPTO has two parts – a deterministic part already known to the 
industry before patent application, and a random component. The deterministic part (D
d
t) is 
termed as the ‘pendency time’. It depends on patent office resources, which may include 
variables like funds at USPTO, number of patent professionals, the degree of automation, the 
patent processing cost to USPTO income ratio to name a few. D
r
t denotes the random non-
recurrent delay. These are random shocks in the patent office budgeting that result in sudden 
increases of the pendency time. We can assume two alternative distributions for this random 
                                                           
5 The cost function can also include variables like the commercialization cost of the invention that the industry has 
to incur. This constitutes the time between the invention happening and the firm actually applying for a patent. This 
involves the time that goes into researching the ‘newness’ of the invention before applying for the patent and also 
other monetary costs.  
  7delay - the uniform distribution and the exponential distribution. However the exponential 
distribution is intuitively more appealing as it implies that the probability of a longer delay is 
smaller than the probability of a shorter delay
6.   
Suppose D
r
t follows an exponential distribution
7. This implies that the probability of 
occurrence of a shorter delay is greater than that of a longer delay. The probability density 




t>0 to guarantee an interior solution, the expected cost of patenting is given by: 














(9)                                                                                  
d
t t a D L EC kt θ θ φ − + =
 
Now we have two
9 alternative specifications of the model: Cobb-Douglas production function 
and the spillover production with Dt
r having an exponential distribution for both the models. 
Equation (10), later in the paper, gives the reduced form estimation equation. 
 
SECTION 3: DATA DESCRIPTION 
  This section briefly outlines the data that has been used to formulate the empirical model. 
The US data is obtained mainly from two sources. The R&D data for the various industries is 
obtained from the Science and Engineering Indicators (1990 –1998)
10 survey that is published by 
                                                           
6 Assuming a uniform distribution means that a long and short random delay are equi-probable. 
7 The uniform distribution is is defined for the domain [0, Dm]. The probability density function is given by: 
f(D
r
t)=1/Dm for 0<Dm≤∞ and f(D
r
t)= 0 otherwise.  The mean is ½.Dm and the standard deviation is Dm/√12. 
Therefore the expected cost of patenting (ECkt) is: 
2
m D d
t D t L kt EC
θ
θ φ + + =  
8 The parameter ‘a’ is the mean and standard deviation of the distribution. 
9 There are four alternative specifications if we include the uniform random delay. 
10 The data could not be extended to 2000 due to an industry classification change (from SICs to NAICs) that makes 
comparison across the groups difficult.   
  8the National Science Foundation (NSF). The patent data is obtained from NBER’s Patent dataset. 
The figures about the PTO costs, fees, number of examiners, etc. were obtained from the Annual 
Report of the Commissioner of Patents and Trademark Office (1976-1996).  
The state-level data is collected from National Science Foundation’s “National Patterns 
of Research and Development Resources” (1983 – 2000). The total state-wise industrial R&D, 
federal R&D funding to industry and university funding data is for alternate years from 1981 to 
1998 for the top ten R&D performing states (California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New 
York, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington). This data is not disaggregated by 
industry.  
The analysis is conducted at two levels. The first set of regressions is at the industry 
level. The second part of the analysis is done on state-level shares of patents and R&D and is not 
disaggregated by industry. The following section gives an explanation of the variables used in 
both the models. The variables are divided to two sections - the US Patent Office variables and 
the industry specific variables.  
 
Section 3.1: Patent Office Variables 
The dependent variable in the industry-level model is log of patents. For the state-level 
model, it is the logit-transformed share of the patents granted to that state. Patents refer to the 
number of patents issued by the USPTO to domestic (US) inventors in various categories
11. 
Figure 1(a) shows the overall US patent application and issue. It illustrates that while patent 
                                                           
11 Usually there are two parameters by which patents can be assigned – ‘inventor state’ or ‘assignee state’. Suppose 
the inventor of a patent lives in the US but the company who owns the patent has its headquarters in Japan, then the 
‘inventor state’ search will assign this patent to the US while the ‘assignee state’ search will assign this patent to 
Japan. If there are multiple inventors, the ‘inventor state’ search gives the state of the first inventor. The common 
convention is to use the state of the first inventor while counting patents – the methodology followed by the NBER 
  9applications have risen dramatically over the years, the increase in patent issue has been more 
gradual. The next figure shows the total number of assigned to each state. It shows that other 
than California, the patent issues have not risen dramatically over the years. Most states show a 
moderate increase in the number of patents. New Jersey and Ohio show a slight fall in the patent 
numbers.                                                       
For the industry-level analysis, I study four industrial categories – electronics, chemicals/ 
biology, transportation and aeronautics
12. Figure 2 shows the industry specific patent issue. 
Electronics and chemicals are the high patenting industries. The average patent numbers are 
much lower for the biology, transportation and aeronautics industry. All five industries show a 
dip in patents around 1979. Patents issue again rises from 1983. 
  The pendency time is the time that elapses between the application for a patent and its 
issuance and abandonment. This is a variable that is intricately linked with the resources at the 
USPTO. Figure 3 illustrates that more resources and more patent examiners mean a shorter 
pendency time. Thus ideally captures the patent office budget constraint and is important in 
explaining variations in patenting in the short-run (Griliches, 1989). The pendency time peaked 
at 1983 and has been falling steadily after that, albeit with a slight increase around 1991
13.  
  In the time frame under consideration, there have been two major law changes (1981 & 
1991) that have affected the fees collected by the PTO. The first dealt with fee increases
14 and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
patent data set. For robustness check I also used the ‘assignee-state’ search criteria to retrieve patent from the 
USPTO database. Using this as the independent variable did not significantly change the results.  
12 Please ask the author if you need information about the detailed sub-classes and exact class codes used by the 
PTO. 
13 Although, the pendency time varies by the type of patents, due to unavailability of that data, I use the average 
pendency time of utility patents. 
14 Before, 1981, the fees charged by the office had been inflexibly set by statute. Patent fees had no changed since 
1965 and had declined continuously compared to operating costs. The 1981 law required that the PTO set fees at a 
rate that would cover 50 percent of the patent process cost, 50 percent of the trademark processing cost and 100 
percent of the cost of all other PTO services.
 (Public Law 96-517). This provision applied : “Except in the case of 
design patents, the 50 percent of the patent processing cost will be made up from fees recovering 25 percent of 
  10the other altered PTO funding sources
15. The latter (1991) hiked PTO fees by 69 percent and 
converted the USPTO from a partially user-fee funded agency to an almost fully user-fee funded 
agency
16. In the estimation, the 1981 law change did not have any significant effect on the patent 
numbers.  
 
Section 3.2: Industry Specific Variables 
Total, Federal & Company R&D figures are obtained from the Science and Engineering 
Indicators
17. The industries were selected based on their SIC codes as seen from the table 2(A). 
There can be several types of R&D depending on which entity performs and who funds the 
R&D. For the industry level model we consider three different types of R&D – federal funding 
for R&D in that industry, the industry’s own funding of R&D and the University performed 
R&D in that industrial field. From figure 4, we can observe that aeronautics R&D peaked in the 
mid-eighties mainly due to an enormous increase in federal funding. For the other industries, 
R&D shows an increasing trend mainly due to an increase in company R&D funding. In these 
sectors federal R&D funding fell after the mid-eighties. A detailed industry specific R&D graph 
with the funding sources is illustrated in figures 5(a) – (d). Biology is not included in the tables 
as data for federal R&D funding is unavailable except for 3 years. 
  For the US data, there are three variants of the spillover term. First it is constructed as an 
interaction between current company R&D flow and current federal R&D stock. This term is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
application processing cost and 25 percent of maintenance costs.” (Report of the Commissioner of Patents and 
Trademarks, 1981). This led to substantial fee increases in 1981. 
13 This eliminated public funding for the PTO. This was done in order to produce savings in the federal budget 
deficit. This change started with the “The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990” (Budget Act – Public Law 101-508) 
and was formalized by the “Patent and Trademark Office Authorization Act of 1991”. 
16 The dummy variable used to account for this change, set year 1990=1. 
17 1989(table 6-3, 6-4 & 6-5), 1993 (4-31. 4-32 & 4-33), 1998(table at-04-20...21) (1971.'73 are interpolated). The 
figures were originally in millions of current dollars. They have been converted to thousands of 1992 dollars using 
the GDP implicit price deflator (base year 1992 = 100). 
  11included in the Cobb Douglas model & the spillover model. In the spillover model, it can also be 
defined as an interaction between current federal R&D stock and current company R&D stock. 
Third, spillover between academic and company R&D is characterized as an interaction between 
current university R&D flow and current company R&D flow. For the state model, the two 
spillover terms are (i) an interaction between federal intramural R&D stock
18 and total industrial 
R&D stock and (ii) an interaction term between the stock of federally funded industrial R&D and 
stock of company funded industrial R&D.  
The academic R&D funds (university performed R&D) show the total amount of money 
that the universities and colleges spend in various academic fields
19. The source of these funds 
may be federal, company or the university’s own resources. Table 2(B) shows the classification 
of various academic disciplines under the four broad industrial categories. The classification 
loosely follows the classification by Jaffe (1989). Figure 6(a) and (b) show the amount of R&D 
dollars that the universities spend in each industrial sector. It shows that expenditure in the 
biology and the transportation fields have doubled between 1984 and 1994. Electronics, 
chemicals and aeronautics R&D spending have increased gradually.  
The size of an industry size can measured in several ways. The number of firms in the 
industry, the amount of output or value added and the total employment in the sector can all be 
                                                           
18 The stock of R&D is constructed by the following formula: 
RDSTKkt = RDkt + RD k, t-1/(1+r) + RD k, t-2/(1+r)
2 + …………+ RD k, t-m/(1+r)
m
Here k denotes the industry and t denotes the time period. M is set to 4, for the US data. It was the largest possible 
value that allowed me to estimate the federal stock over the entire period 1976-1995. Here r is the depreciation rate 
of R&D and its value is 0.12 following Nadiri and Purcha’s report of the social rate of depreciation of R&D capital 
(1996). 
19 There was a missing data problem in the academia performed R&D. Some years were not reported by the NSF 
because of confidentiality reasons. Below I outline the procedure undertaken to solve this problem. Materials 
Engineering : Roughly the share of this class in total engineering R&D is between 10.5 - 9.3% between the period 
1990-1998. Therefore we take the average of this number (9.9%) and extrapolate the R&D figures between 1980-
1990. Thus the 'other eng' figures also change. They are constructed as (1980-1990) [Total R&D in that class - 
sum(all 5 subclasses)]. I use this to back-cast the years 1976-1979. The 'other eng' figures are the difference between 
total and the sum of the 5 subclasses. 
  12used to proxy size. In this paper, I use three measures alternative measures for size – gross 
output
20, share of GDP that is attributed to each industry
21 and employment figures. For the state 
data I use the state share of gross state product coming from private industries.  
The R&D composition term, a proxy for how private the industry is in terms of its R&D 
funding, is defined as follows:  
1 0                                           ) URDSH ( 1 ,  t k, , , ≤ ≤ + − = t k t k t k COMP FEDSH COMP
 
where: FEDSH denotes the share of federal R&D funds in that industry and URDSH denotes the 
university expenditure in that particular field in any given year.  The transportation and chemical 
industries are the most private in terms of R&D, biology and aeronautics are the least private and 
electronics falls in between. However, when we consider chemical and biology together, the 
combined industry, the combined industry shows the same trend as the chemical industry. 
The next section outlines the empirical model and results. It has two main parts. The first 
discusses the result for the US. This part is based on four industries spanning twenty-three years. 
For the econometric model we collapse chemicals and biology into one industry due to 
unavailability of data for federal spending on Biology for a large number of years. The second 
part analyzes the state results. Here the panel comprises the top ten R&D states for 10 years. This 
estimation does not distinguish between industry groups.  
                                                           
20 Annual estimates of gross output by detailed industry for 1976-95 represents the market value of an industry's 
production, including commodity taxes, and it differs from GPO, which represents an industry's contribution to 
GDP. The 1977-98 figures are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis data on Industry (The 1976 figures 
are extrapolated). The aeronautics class contained some extra SIC codes other than 372 and 376. Since there was no 
precise aeronautics class in the table, I have proxied it by the 'other transportation equipment' class. This increases 
the size of gross output, but the effect on industry size is minor 
21 This is the traditional ‘value added’ measure. 
  13SECTION 4: ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
Section 4.1: US Results 
  This section presents the estimation results obtained from the two models outlined earlier 
in the paper. The analysis is done at the industry level. The panel consists of 4 industries 
(Electronics, Chemical/Biology, Transportation, Aeronautics) and 23 years (1976-1998) of data. 
The general reduced form equation is given below. It relates current patents (Pkt) to company 
R&D stock (CRDSTKkt), federal R&D stock or spillover from federal R&D (FRDSTKkt), 
spillover (SPLkt), academic R&D (URDkt), composition (COMPkt-r), size (SIZEkt), law change 
(Lt) and deterministic and random pedency times (D
d
t, ).  
(10)                                     ln ln                      
  ln ln ln ln   ln ln        
kt 2
d
t 1 2 1
4 3 2 1
ε δ ϕ ϕ γ γ
β β β β α
+ + + + + +




kt kt kt kt kt
D D SIZE COMP
URD SPL FRDSTK CRDSTK P
 
The error component is εkt (idiosyncratic error) and δk is the industry specific fixed effect. I use a 
fixed effects panel data model to estimate these equations
22. For the purposes of econometric 
estimation certain modifications had to be made to the theoretical model. First, year dummies 
and a trend term were included in the equation to account for macroeconomic changes. Second, 
there seemed to be a significant change in regime after 1990. To account for this, all the 
independent variables were interacted with the 1990 law dummy and included in the regression.  
The regression contains a logged dependent variable and the independent variables are a 
mix of logs and levels. The coefficients of the log variables denote the elasticity
23. The 
                                                           
22 The panel was tested for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and robustness checks were performed. 
23 For these variables, the marginal effect is given by: δ(patent grant)/δ(independent variable) = (coefficient * patent 
grant)/independent variable. The marginal effect of the variables that are not in logs (like pendency time) is given 
by: δ(patent grant)/δ(independent variable) = coefficient * patent grant 
  14interaction terms with the 1990 dummy denote how important each effect is post 1990.The 
interpretation of the coefficients is as follows: For pre-1990 - the elasticities are denoted by the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables. For post-1990: the elasticities are denoted by 
coefficient of variable plus coefficient of interaction term if the interaction term is significant. 
Otherwise the explanatory variable has the same elasticity pre and post 1990.  
The coefficients from the models that contain both level effects and spillover terms need 
a more detailed analysis. The total effect that any variable has on patenting will then be 
determined by the combination of effects from the level and interaction term. To get a sense of 
what this means, we re-write equation (10) as: 
(11)                                 ln ln   ln
) * ln( ln ln   ln ln
kt 2
d
t 1 2 1 4
3 2 1
ε δ ϕ ϕ γ γ β
β β β α
+ + + + + + +
+ + + =
k
r
t kt kt kt
kt kt kt kt kt
D D SIZE COMP URD
CRDFLW FRDSTK FRDSTK CRDSTK P
 
where: (FRDSTK* CRDFLW
24) is the spillover term (SPLkt) from equation (10). For example, 
to look at the total effect of federal R&D stock on patents
25, we differentiate the above 
expression with respect to FRDSTK to get: 
(12b)                                                        * ) (   or    





























Equation (12b) denotes the total effect that a variable has on patents if both level and spillover 
terms are included in the regression. The variables Pkt and FRDSTKkt are evaluated at their 
means
26. 
                                                           
24 CRDFLW denotes the current company R&D Flow. 
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Section 4.1.1: CobbDouglas Model 
  Appendix Table 3(A) outlines the Cobb-Douglas type production function approach to 
patents. It explains how inputs such as different types of R&D are turned into output, i.e. 
patents
27. The model regresses the log of patents on the logs of company R&D stock, federal 
R&D stock, spillover, academia performed R&D, size, R&D composition and also includes the 
pendency time and random delays in patent processing. The panel is balanced with 23 years of 
data for each of the four industrial categories.  
We find that company R&D is positive and strongly significant pre-1990. In this period, 
the elasticity of patents with respect to R&D is 0.807, i.e. for one percent increase in company 
R&D stock, patents increase by 0.807 percent. Converted to dollar term, this implies that for 
every dollar increase in company R&D stock, patents are going to increase by 0.2. Post-1990, 
this elasticity is also positive (0.055), but much smaller. In this period, one million dollar 
increase in company R&D stock will lead to patents increasing by 0.01. For federal R&D, the 
pre-1990 the elasticity is positive and significant (0.993) but post-1990, although numerically 
smaller, it is negative and significant (-0.294). This implies that post-1990, the more federal ‘soft 
funds’ an industry can fall back on, the less patents it’s going to receive.  
The spillover term shows the opposite trend. Pre-1990, federal R&D had a negative 
spillover on current company R&D flow (-0.972) – there seems to be some evidence of crowding 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
25 Analyzing the total effect of company R&D stock is problematic because the spillover term does not contain the 
company R&D stock. 
26 Fore pre-1990, the means are taken till 1989 (14 years). For post-1990, the means are from 1990-1998 (9 years). 
27 In recent patent literature, there has been discussion about including lagged versus current R&D in the equation. A 
common finding is that current R&D is significantly correlated with current patent applications (Jaffe, 1986). A 
tentative explanation for this high correlation is given by the fact that a huge amount of money is spent on 
developing a product once the patent application is done. For my production function type approach, linking patent 
grants to current R&D flow is problematic, as it is not an input for the patents that are being currently issued. Thus, I 
use stocks of R&D to avoid the problem of playing with lags. 
  16out. However, post-1990, the spillovers are positive (0.478) and significant. The table below 
provides the total effect that federal R&D stock has on patents for both the time periods. Here β 
and χ are not the elasticities reported in Appendix Table 3(A), model (i). They are the marginal 
effects. All R&D variables are in thousands of dollars. 
Table 1: Total Effect of Federal R&D Stock on Patenting 
 Pre-1990  Post-1990 
Marginal Effect of FRDSTK   0.0028  -0.002 
Marginal Effect of SPL  -0.0000000003   0.00000000023 
Total Effect of FRDSTK on Patents   0.00006   0.0014 
Note: These marginal effects are denoted by: δ(patent grant)/δ(independent variable) = (coefficient 
 * patent grant)/independent variable. The total effect is calculated from equation (12b). 
 
From the table above we see that pre-1990, a one million dollar increase in federal R&D stock 
increases patents by 0.06 and post-1990 it increases patents by 1.4. Thus even though spillover or 
level effect by itself may be negative, I find that the total effect of federal R&D stock is positive 
in both periods. Also, post-1990, federal R&D is much more effective than pre-1990. 
Current university R&D is not significant pre-1990. In the latter period it has a positive 
and significant effect on patenting. Universities spend more money in those fields where 
technological opportunities are the greatest. Thus, this could be interpreted as a variable that 
reflects the increase in technological opportunity in the industry after 1990.  The composition 
variables are not significant in either period. The size variable is positive and weakly significant 
(at 17 percent).  
The ‘pendency time’ variable is significant and negative in both periods. The greater the 
delay in processing a patent, the lesser the number of patents issued. This supports Griliches’s 
claim (Griliches, 1989) that in the short-run patents are very heavily affected by patent office 
variables. The effect is greater in the post-1990 period. In the earlier period a 1 percent increase 
  17in pendency time decreased patents by 0.05 percent, whereas post-1990 the percentage decrease 
is 0.5, ten times greater than before. The table below translates the coefficients into actual 
numbers, for e.g., pre-1990, a one-month increase in pendency time decreases patents granted by 
348. 
Table 2: Marginal Effect of Pendency Time & Random Delay on Patenting
Marginal Effects  Pre-1990  Post-1990 
Patent Pendency Time  -346.6  -5448.2 
Random Exponential Delay  -76.3  -1870.8 
Note: These marginal effects are denoted by: δ(patent grant)/δ(independent variable) 
 =  (coefficient* patent grant)/independent variable. 
 
Another interesting observation that emerges from this model is, that not only does the 
actual pendency time matter, but the random variance in pendency time also has a significant 
negative effect on patents granted. In fact post-1990, this random delay seems to affect patenting 
more severely that the earlier period with a one-month random delay decreasing patents by 1871.  
 
Section 4.1.2: Spillover Model 
  The specifications in Appendix Table 3(B) attempts to directly capture the spillover from 
federal and academic R&D. This model explores the relationship between company R&D, 
federal R&D, academic R&D, spillovers and patents. The spillover terms in this model capture 
the effect of federal R&D stock on both current company R&D stock and flow
28. By not 
including the federal R&D term directly, this model attempts to explore such spillovers more 
                                                           
28 Spillover 1 = Current Federal RD Stock * Current Company RD Flow, Spillover Term 2 = Current Federal RD 
Stock * Current Company RD Stock 
  18thoroughly. The academic spillover term captures the spillover from current academic R&D to 
current company R&D. 
  From Appendix Table 3(B), I find that current company R&D stock is positive and 
significant pre-1990 for both specifications. Post-1990, the first model shows a positive effect 
(0.055) whereas the second specification shows a negative effect (-0.129). However when we 
consider the total effect that company R&D has on patenting
29, it is positive for both 
specifications. The federal R&D spillover terms have no effect on patenting in the pre-1990 
period in either model. Post-1990, the federal spillover is positive and significant and the 
coefficients have the same magnitude in the two models. This implies that in both models, a one 
percent increase in federal R&D spillovers will lead to a 0.16 percent increase in patents. The 
pendency time and random delay behave exactly like the earlier Cobb-Douglas model and is 
negative and significant in both periods. 
Pre-1990, academic research is positive and significant although the spillover from 
academic to current company R&D flow is negative suggesting evidence of crowding out. Post-
1990, the coefficient of university R&D is negative and significant, ranging from –0.52 to 0.7. 
This implies that, ceteris paribus academic spending on research dampens patenting activity after 
1990. But at the same time, the spillover from academic to company R&D is positive and 
significant, implying that academic R&D has the power to make company R&D more effective. 
The total effect is slightly negative in both periods.  
From the preceding discussion, the main facts that emerge are (a) company R&D stock 
has a positive and significant affect on patenting in both the periods under consideration, 
although the effect is smaller post-1990, (b) the total effect of federal R&D stock on patenting is 
                                                           
29 Calculated by equation (12b) 
  19also positive and significant, (c) academic R&D presents a mixed picture with the overall effect 
being small but negative. A tentative explanation for this may be that most academic R&D goes 
to basic research that does not yield many patents, (d) the pendency time has a negative and 
significant effect on patenting as does the random delay. The following section presents the 
results of the state-share models.  
 
Section 4.2: State Results 
  The state analysis is done for the top ten R&D states in the US. The panel consists 
of 10 states and 10 years of data for each of them. Between them, these states accounted for 64 
percent of the total US R&D and 62 percent of the issued patents in 1995. In the US data, the 
main purpose of the models was to explain what drives patenting in the United States. For the 
state data I ask a slightly different question. Here we are interested in what determines the state 
share of patents. This model does not distinguish between the various industries
30. It is 
interesting to study the state shares because it gives us an idea about the how and why the 
relative position of the states change. Figure 7 illustrates how industrial R&D shares and patents 
shares are related. We observe, that compared to the other states, California’s share of patents is 
much less compared to its share of industrial R&D. It gets about 22% of the US industrial R&D 
but accounts for only 16% of the patents. The bias is even more pronounced for federal R&D. 
Compared to this, a state like New York, accounts for roughly 8 percent of the US industrial 
R&D and patents. 
                                                           
30 This is due to severe data constraint. The state-wise breakdown of R&D funding by industry is extremely hard to 
come by.  
  20The dependent variable in all the state models is the share of patents in each state
31. All 
the independent variables are also in shares. In this context one cannot estimate a straight panel 
data model regressing the patent shares on other independent variables. One needs to incorporate 
the constraint, that the linear predictions will be bounded between zero and one. A common way 
to solve this is to apply a logit transformation
32 to the dependent variable. Thus for all the 
specifications in Appendix Tables 4(A) and (B), the dependent variables are logit 
transformations of the state share of patents. State fixed effects are incorporated in all models to 
control state level effects. 
  Appendix Table 4(A) gives the results of the basic and spillover state-share model.   
Models (i) – (ii) estimate the basic model. The main difference between the models is the level of 
disaggregation of the various R&D terms. Model (i) breaks up R&D expenditure by the 
performing entity, viz. state share of total federally performed intramural
33 R&D, state share of 
total industry performed R&D and state share of total academia performed R&D. Model (ii) 
disaggregates R&D by the source of funds. Model (iii) disaggregates both industry performed 
and academia performed R&D by the source of funds. All the independent variables have been 
constructed from stocks of R&D.  
In all the models, the effect of the state share of federal intramural R&D stock is positive 
and significant. This implies that the higher the share of federal intramural R&D in a state, the 
higher its share of patents. Share of total industry performed R&D also has a positive and 
significant effect. When this is disaggregated (models ii & iii), the estimates show disparate 
                                                           
31 State Share of Patent = Total number of utility patents granted to that state/Total number of US utility patents. The 
state of the first inventor is allotted the patents in case of multiple inventors. 
32 Let ‘s’ be the state share of patents in a year (dependent variable). The logit transformed dependent variable will 
then be: log (s/(1-s)). The marginal effects are given by: δs/δx = βe
βx(1-s)/(1+e
βx) where  ‘x’ is an independent 
variable in levels and δs/δx = βx
(β-1)(1-s)/(1+x
β), when x’ is an independent variable in logs. 
33 Federal intramural R&D implies federally performed and federally funded R&D expenditures. 
  21effect of funding source on patents. The share of company funded industrial R&D in the state has 
a strong positive on state patent shares, whereas the federally funded industrial R&D has no 
effect on the state share of patents. This seems to hint at the fact that federally funds may be 
directed at basic research activities that do not yield many patents. The company funds on the 
other hand, may be directed more towards the development phase of a product or applied 
research that yields more patents. Company funded academic R&D has no effect of patent shares 
where as federally funded academic R&D seems to depress patent shares (model iii). This 
indicates that federal grants to academic institutions alleviate the need for universities to patent 
aggressively. With federal funding universities can focus more on basic research that do not 
yield many patents and thus the negative effect of federal funds on patenting. The state share of 
industrial GSP is insignificant in all the models. 
The next set of results (Models (vi) and (v)) investigates the role of spillovers. Three 
alternative specifications of spillovers are outlined. Spillover term 1 is designed to capture the 
spillover effects from federal intramural research to industry-performed research – for e.g. the 
spillover from NASA research funds to the global positioning system research by the 
electronics/computer industry. It is the interaction between the stock
34 of federal intramural 
funds and the stock of total industry performed R&D. Spillover term 2 denotes the spillovers 
between federally funded and company funded industrial research. It is the interaction between 
the stock of federal funds for industry R&D and the stock of company funds for industry R&D. 
Spillover term 3 captures a specific aspect of the spillovers from the academia to the industry, 
viz. the spillovers that occur between industry sponsored academic research and industry 
research. It is the interaction between the stocks of industry funds for academia performed R&D 
                                                           
34 Stocks are constructed as in the previous US model with a 12 percent discount rate. 
  22and the stock of total industry performed R&D. In the estimation equation, these spillover terms 
have been turned to shares, because we are interested in knowing what happens to patent share 
when the share of spillovers in the state increase
35. 
  The level results are the same as in the basic model. All the alternative specifications 
show that the state share of federal funds for intramural R&D performers and industry performed 
R&D have a strong positive effect on patent shares. When industry R&D is disaggregated by 
funding source, we find that company funds, rather than federal funds are a source of patents. In 
model (i) we find that federal intramural R&D that has a negative spillover (spillover term 1), 
whereas federal funds for industrial R&D have a positive spillover (spillover term 2). In the basic 
model earlier, academia performed research seemed to have no effect on patent shares. In the 
spillover model we find that even though the level effects are negligible, academic R&D that is 
funded by the industry has a strong positive spillover of industrial R&D. 
This insignificant level coefficient of the share of federal funds for industrial R&D 
coupled with the positive spillover term implies that, although not effective by itself, federal 
funds to industry work by enhancing the productivity of company funded R&D. A good example 
of this would be in the electricity industry. After deregulation, EPRI (the collaborative R&D 
organization) is using the ‘public’ part of the research money to conduct the earlier part of the 
research when results are still uncertain. Once the project seems commercially viable, the utility 
companies step in with their funding. Thus spillovers from federal R&D share increase patent 
share through subsidizing commercial research. A similar explanation can be forwarded for 
industry funded academic R&D. However, the negative effect of federal intramural R&D on 
total industry performed R&D attests to the fact that large federal intramural expenditures have a 
                                                           
35 Therefore I use: State share of spillover = Total state spillover/Total US spillover.  
  23tendency to crowd out industrial R&D, the main source of patents, and thus depress the patent 
numbers.  
An important thing that should be kept in mind while drawing conclusions about state 
level results is the dominance of California. It accounts for 16 percent o the US patents and 20 
percent of total US R&D funds. Of the top 10 R&D states, it accounts for 27 percent of the 
patents, 32 percent of the total R&D and 41 percent of the total federal R&D. For this table we 
estimate an error components model to separate out the California effect and to allow us to 
introduce a California dummy. The Hausman test fails to reject the random effects specification. 
We can conclude that there is a significant California effect. In the basic R&D model if we 
introduce a California specific dummy (Appendix Table 4(B)) it turns out to be significant and 
negative. Deleting California from the sample or introducing the dummy makes all the positive 
coefficients larger in magnitude, although there is no fundamental change in the results.  
 
SECTION 5: POLICY IMPLICATIONS & CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the empirical findings of the model some preliminary policy recommendations 
can be advanced. First, any government policy that seeks to increase patents through direct 
federal funding of industrial research or by the way of spillovers will be more effective post-
1990 than the period before it. Second, company R&D is a significant determinant of patents, 
although post-1990, its effect is becoming less elastic – maybe hinting at the exhaustion of 
inventive opportunity. Third, university performed R&D seems to dampen patenting and a more 
through investigation is needed before any conclusions can be drawn. Fourth, random and non-
random patent office delay severely hampers patenting. Thus, the government should not 
appropriate any resources for the USPTO and divert it elsewhere. Decreasing resources at the 
  24patent office will adversely affect the number of patent issued. The patent office should aim at 
reducing its ‘pendency time’. Fifth, random fluctuations in the ‘pendency time’ should be 
avoided as this has a negative effect on patents. The USPTO should announce the expected 
‘pendency time’ at the beginning of the year and maintain that through the year. This would 
reduce the uncertainly of the timing of patent issue and would help the companies plan better. 
Sixth, from the state models we see that not only is the performed of R&D important, but the 
funding source also determines what effect the R&D expenditure will have on patenting. Thus 
the empirical results point to an important role for the government.  
As economists delve more into the areas of technology, invention and productivity, 
patents will remain one of the main yardsticks by which they measure the innovative capacity of 
a society of industry. In this context one needs to understand how various forces interact to 
generate a patent. This paper’s contribution is to show how various factors, some of which have 
little to do with an entity’s inventive capacity, influence patents. It illustrates how types of R&D 
expenditure, structure of the market and patent office resources determine the domestic patent 
numbers. Another contribution of the paper is to break down R&D by performing and funding 
agency and study their differing effects on patenting. It illustrates that in the short run, a decline 
or increase in the number of patents has more to do with fluctuations in the above variables than 
with any fundamental change in inventive opportunity. Further work needs to be done in this 
area to understand the patenting process in depth and make patents better yardsticks of the 
innovation capacity of a society. 
  
  25APPENDIX TABLE 1(A)
SUMMARY OF MAIN VARIABLES FOR INDUSTRY LEVEL ANALYSIS 
Variable  Mean  S.D. Min Max     Variable Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
Log (Patents Granted to 
US Residents) 
7.92  1.82 4.51 10.36 
 
Log(Spill - Past Fed 
RD Flow on Curr 
Com RD Flow) 
30.37 1.65  25.16  32.62 
Log (Total R&D 
Performed in Industrial 
Field)  
16.36 0.47 15.35 17.20 
 
Log(Spill - Past Fed 
RD Stk on Curr 
Com RD Flow) 
31.50 1.74  26.04  33.83 
Log (Com Funding for 
Industrial R&D) 
15.82 0.40 14.97 16.89 
 
Log(Spill - Curr Fed 
RD Stk on Curr 
Com RD Stk) 
32.68 1.75  27.16  35.08 
Log (Stk Com Funding for 
Industrial R&D)  
17.00 0.39 16.20 18.00 
 
Log(Composition) -0.54 0.45  -1.52  -0.11 
Log (Fed Funding for 
Industrial R&D)  
14.39 1.82 7.90 16.92 
 
Log(Size) 6.96  0.37  6.31  7.58 
Log (Stock Fed Funding 
for Industrial R&D)  
15.68 1.74 9.81 18.08 
 
Pendency Time  20.99  2.22 18.20  25.50 
Log(University Performed 
R&D in Industry Field)  





3.39 3.57  0.03  13.95 
 
APPENDIX TABLE 1(B)
SUMMARY OF MAIN VARIABLES FOR STATE LEVEL ANALYSIS 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
State Share of Patents   0.064 0.036  0.013 0.197
State Share of Federal Intramural R&D Stock  0.030  0.033  0.005  0.143 
State Share of Total Federal R&D Stock  0.051  0.060  0.010  0.247 
State Share of Total Industry Performed R&D  0.070  0.052  0.023  0.225 
State Share of Industry Performed Federally Funded R&D  0.070  0.102  0.003  0.435 
State Share of Industry Performed Federally Funded R&D   0.070  0.039  0.009  0.212 
State Share of Total Academia Performed R&D  0.016  0.011  0.004  0.066 
State Share of Academia Performed Federally Funded R&D  0.054  0.037  0.012  0.144 
State Share of Academia Performed Industry Funded R&D  0.045  0.024  0.007  0.095 
State Share of Private Industrial GSP  0.055  0.032  0.017  0.140 
State Share of Spillover 1(Stock of Fed Intramural RD to 
Stock of Total Industry Performed R&D) 
0.003 0.007 0.0002 0.032 
State Share of Spillover 2(Stock of Fed RD Funds to Industry 
to Stock of Company Funds for Industry) 
0.008 0.016 0.0002 0.067 
State Share of Spillover 3 (Stock of Industry Funds for Univ. 
to Total Stock of Industry Performed R&D) 
0.004 0.004 0.0002 0.021 
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APPENDIX TABLE 2(A) 
MATCHING UP INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATIONS AND SIC CODES 
Industry SIC  Code  Sub-Classes 
Electronics  36, 357, 393  Radio and TV receiving equipment, Communication equipment, 
Electronics components, Other electrical equipment, Computers 
Musical Instruments 
 
Chemical 28  (except 
283), 348 
 
Industrial chemicals, Other chemicals, Explosives 
 
Biology  283, 384, 385  Drugs and medicine, Surgical Instruments, Opthalmic goods 
 
Transportation 37(except  372 
& 376) 
Motor vehicles and equipment, Other transportation equipment. 
 




APPENDIX TABLE 2(B) 
MATCHING UP INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION AND ACADEMIC DISCIPLINES 
Industry Academic  Discipline 
Electronics  Electrical Engineering, Astronomy, Physics, Other Physical 
sciences, Math and Computers. 
 
Chemical  Chemical Engineering, Materials Engineering, Chemistry. 
 
Biology Life  Sciences 
 
Transportation  There was no transportation category. So it was proxied by the 
Mechanical Engineering sub-class. 
 
Aeronautics Aerospace  Engineering 
  27APPENDIX  TABLE 3(A) 
 
COBB DOUGLAS MODEL WITH RANDOM DELAY 
Fixed Effects Model  




Independent Variable  (i) 
Log (Company R&D Stock for Industrial R&D)  
 
 0.807  (0.360)  ** 
Log (Federal R&D Stock for Industrial R&D)  
 
 0.993  (0.264)  ** 
Log (Spillover Term) 
 
-0.972  (0.258)  ** 
Log(University Performed R&D in Industry Field)  
 
-0.311  (0.292) 
Log(Composition Term) 
 
 0.291  (0.249) 
Log(Size) 
 
 0.304  (0.220) 
Pendency Time  
 
-0.050  (0.012)  ** 
Random Delay in Pat Process:Exp Distr. (s.d.=4 mths.) 
 
-0.011  (0.006)  ** 
Log (Com. R&D Stock for Industrial R&D) * Dum90 
 
-0.752  (0.483)  ** 
Log (Fed. R&D Stock for Industrial R&D) * Dum90 
 
-1.287  (0.378)  ** 
Log (Spillover Term)* Dum90 
 
 1.500  (0.389)  ** 
Log(Univ. Performed R&D in Industry Field) * Dum90 
 
 0.092  (0.060)  * 
Log(Composition Term) * Dum90 
 




Pendency Time * Dum90 
 
-0.448  (0.200)  ** 
Random Delay in Pat Process:Exp. Distri. (s.d.=4 mths.) * Dum90  -0.160  (0.049)  ** 
Constant  -35.79  (43.20) 
 
R-Squared 0.345 
Note: The estimation technique is a fixed effects panel data model. The panel is balanced with 23 observations per group. The 
sample size is 92.The period under consideration is 1976-1998. Both models contain year dummies. The interaction terms denote 
how important each effect is post 1990. The interpretation of the coefficients is as follows: For pre-1990 - the marginal effects are 
denoted by the coefficients of the explanatory variables. For post-1990: the marginal effects are denoted by coefficient of 
variable + coefficient of interaction term if the interaction term is significant. Otherwise the explanatory variable has the same 
marginal effect pre and post 1990. The models also include a time trend that is insignificant. The exponential distribution is given 
by f(Dr)= (1/b)e
(-Tr/b) and s.d. = b.. All dollar terms are in thousands of 1992 dollars. The spillover term is constructed by 
interacting the federal R&D stock with current company R&D flow. The composition term shows how private the industry is. 
‘**’ denotes significance at 5 percent and ‘*’ denotes significance at 10 percent. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 3(B) 
SPILLOVER MODEL WITH RANDOM DELAY 
Fixed Effects Model  
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Dependent Variable  Log(Patents Issued) 
Independent Variable  (i) (ii) 
 
Log (Company R&D Stock for Industrial R&D)    0.807  (0.360)  **   0.786  (0.361)  ** 
Log (Spillover Term 1)   0.021  (0.057)  - 
Log (Spillover Term 2)   -   0.021  (0.062) 
Log(University Performed R&D in Industry Field)    0.682  (0.343)  **   0.661  (0.360)  * 
Spillover From Academic to Industry R&D  -0.993  (0.264)  **  -1.005  (0.284)  ** 
Log(Composition Term)   0.291  (0.249)   0.291  (0.248) 
Log(Size)   0.304  (0.229)   0.303  (0.230) 
Pendency Time   -0.050  (0.012)  **  -0.050  (0.012)  ** 
Random Delay in Pat Process:Exp Distr. (s.d.=4 mths.)  -0.011  (0.006)  **  -0.011  (0.006)  ** 
Log (Com. R&D Stock for Industrial R&D) * Dum90  -0.752  (0.483)  **  -0.915  (0.485)  ** 
Log (Spillover Term1)* Dum90   0.163  (0.062)  **  - 
Log (Spillover Term2)* Dum90  -   0.163  (0.062)  ** 
Log(Univ. Performed R&D in Industry Field) * Dum90 -1.196  (0.384)  **  -1.358  (0.387)  ** 
Spillover From Academic to Industry R&D* Dum90   1.288  (0.378)  **   1.450  (0.389)  ** 
Log(Composition Term) * Dum90  -0.087  (0.174)  -0.087  (0.175) 
Log(Size)* Dum90  -0.389 (0.330)  -0.389  (0.330) 
Pendency Time * Dum90  -0.448  (0.200)  **  -0.448  (0.200)  ** 
Random Delay in Pat Process:Exp. Distri. (s.d.=4 
mths.) * Dum90 
-0.160  (0.049)  **  -0.160  (0.049)  ** 
Constant  -35.79  (43.20)  -35.79  (43.20) 
R-Squared 0.345  0.345 
Note: The estimation technique is a fixed effects panel data model. The panel is balanced with 23 observations per group. The 
sample size is 92.The period under consideration is 1976-1998. Both models contain year dummies. The interaction terms denote 
how important each effect is post 1990. The interpretation is similar to the earlier table. The models also include a time trend that 
is insignificant. The exponential distribution is given by f(Dr)= (1/b)e
(-Tr/b) and s.d. = b.. All dollar terms are in thousands of 1992 
dollars. The spillover term is constructed as follows:  Spillover 1 = federal R&D stock * current company R&D flow, Spillover 2 
= federal R&D stock * company R&D stock. The composition term shows how private the industry is. ‘**’ denotes significance 
at 5 percent and ‘*’ denotes significance at 10 percent. 
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STATE SHARE MODEL 
Dependent Variable is the Logit Transformed Share of Patents  
Fixed Effects Estimation 
(standard errors in parenthesis) 
  Basic Model  Spillover Model 
  (i)  (ii) (iii) (iv)  (v) 
State Share of Total Federal 











State Share of Total Industry 
Performed R&D Stock 
10.054  **  
(3.006) 




State Share of Industry Performed 






State Share of Industry Performed 
Industry Funded R&D Stock 





State Share of Total Academia 









State Share of Academia Performed 
Industry Funded R&D Stock 
- -  -0.007 
(2.079) 
  
State Share of Academia Performed 
Industry Funded R&D Stock 
-  -  -2.435  ** 
(1.192) 
  
State Share of Spillover Term 1 
 
      -109.65  ** 
(19.567) 
- 
State Share of Spillover Term 2 
 




State Share of Spillover Term 3 
 
     - 28.385 ** 
(13.776) 


















-3.291  ** 
(0.209) 
-3.900  ** 
(0.269) 
-3.462  ** 
(0.309) 
Overall R-Square  0.616 0.561  0.557  0.771  0.552 
Note: The panel consists of 10 states and 10 years for each state. The range is from 1981-1998 with data for alternate years 
starting from 1981. The last 2 years of data are from consecutive years – 1997 and 1998. The sample size to Model (i) is 100 and 
for (ii)-(v) it is 97.All variables are in terms of shares, i.e. the state magnitude as a share of the US magnitude. The coefficients 
are not the marginal effects as the dependent variable is a logit transformation. Spillover Term 1 = Stock of federal 
intramural funds interacted with Stock of Total Industry Performed R&D. Spillover Term 2 = Stock of federal funds 
for industry R&D interacted with Stock of company funds for industry R&D. Spillover Term 3 = Stock of industry 
funds for academia performed R&D interacted with total industry performed R&D Stock. ‘**’ denotes significance at 
5% and ‘*’ denotes significance at 10%.
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APPENDIX TABLE 4(B) 
 
STATE SHARE MODEL: CALIFORNIA EFFECT 
Dependent Variable is the Share of Patents in each State 
Random Effects Estimation 
(standard errors in parenthesis) 
 
  With CA  Without CA  CA Dummy 
 
State Share of Total Federal 






4.40  ** 
(1.761) 
State Share of Total Industry 








State Share of Total Academia 

























-3.628  ** 
(0.206) 
-4.272  ** 
(0.176) 










0.896 0.759  0.700 
Overall R-Square 
 
0.649 0.850  0.838 
Sample Size 
 
100 90  100 
Note:. The panel consists of 10 states and 10 years for each state. The range is from 1981-1998 with data for alternate 
years starting from 1981. The last 2 years of data are from consecutive years – 1997 and 1998. Everything is in terms of 
shares, i.e. the state magnitude as a percentage of the US magnitude. The coefficients are not the marginal effects 






u) shows the share of variance due to 
random effects. The Hausman test could not reject the hypothesis of ‘no systematic difference between 
coefficients for the fixed versus random effects model’. ‘**’ denotes significance at 5% and ‘*’ denotes 
significance at 10% level. 
  31APPENDIX FIGURES 
FIGURE 1(A): TOTAL PATENT APPLICATION AND PATENT ISSUE TO US RESIDENTS (US TOTALS) 
 
           















































































Total Number of Patents Issued To Each State
year
















































PA PA PA PA PA















  32FIGURE 2: PATENTS ISSUED IN FIVE INDUSTRIES: US DATA 
                    













































































          
  33FIGURE 3: PATENT OFFICE EMPLOYMENT & PENDENCY TIME 
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FIGURE 4: TOTAL INDUSTRY PERFORMED R&D EXPENDITURES, US DATA 
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 Patents granted   Company R&D 
 Federal R&D   University R&D 








    
Chemical Industry
Year
 Patents granted   Company R&D 
 Federal R&D   University R&D 











 Patents granted   Company R&D 
 Federal R&D   University R&D 







 Patents granted   Company R&D
 Federal R&D  University R&D










Note: In all the industries except Aeronautics, the R&D variable is in millions of 1992 
dollars. For the aeronautics industry, the R&D variable is in tens of millions of 1992 dollars.
  35FIGURE 6: UNIVERSITY AND COLLEGE R&D EXPENDITURES, US DATA 
 

































































































































   
 
FIGURE 7 
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